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Introduction

The entertainment and copyright production industries have a
substantial impact on our daily lives and enjoyment. According to the
International Intellectual Property Alliance, the core copyright
and entertainment industries accounted for nearly 6.5% of the United

States gross domestic product and exceeded $1 trillion in 2012.' As the
two largest entertainment media producing states, California and New York

* University of California Hastings College of the Law, J.D. Candidate 2015. University of
Southern California, B.A. Economics 2010. The author would like to thank the 2014-15
Comm/Ent staff for their invaluable editorial assistance. The author would also like to thank his
friends and family for their unwavering encouragement and support.
1. Copyright Contributes $1 Trillion to the US. Economy, INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP.
ALLIANCE (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2013_Nov19_PressRelease- Copyright
Report.pdf; see also Richard Verrier, U.S. Copyright Industries Add $1 Trillion to GDP, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/nov/19/business/la-fi-ct-intellectualproperty-20131119.
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are key players and producers in the entertainment industry.2
Entertainment and copyrightable mediums, such as film, television
programs, and music, are all developed by talented artists, who are
supported by their agents and managers. California and New York statutes
that govern the artist-manager and artist-agent relationships have a direct
impact on the artist's creative works and the entertainment industry as a whole.3
Since California's Talent Agencies Act ("TAA") 4 was enacted in 1978,
many managers, artists, and legal critics have been quick to point out its
flaws either through litigation or lobbying. The California Legislature
intended to protect artists from unscrupulous agents who attempt to take
advantage of them financially.s The TAA requires that individuals who
procure employment for artists must acquire a state authorized license to do
so and abide by the regulations set forth in the TAA.6 Disputes, however,
arise between a talent manager and artist when the manager procures
employment for the artist, and the artist withholds the commission to the
manager on the basis that the manager is not a licensed agent under the
statute.7 These clashes give way to a plethora of disputes, which private
arbitrators and the California Labor Commissioner adjudicate annually.
New York Employment Agency Law shares similar common law roots
and statutory provisions 8 but with one major exception: incidental
booking.9 A New York talent manager may procure employment for the
artist where the procurement is incidental to the normal management duties

2. State-by-State Film & Television Economic Contribution, MOTION PICTURE ASS'N OF AM.
(2013), http://www.mpaa.org/wp-content/uploads/infographic/statemap/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2014)
(showing the economic contribution to television and film production by California and New
York is visible when clicking the respective states on the map).
3. See Marathon Entm't., Inc. v. Blasi, 42 Cal. 4th 974, 980 (2008) (holding that the Talent
Agencies Act "appl[ies] to managers as well as agents").
4. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700 (West 2009).
5. Marathon, 42 Cal. 4th at 984.
6. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.5.
7. See William A. Birdthistle, A Contested Ascendancy: Problems with Personal
Managers Acting as Producers, 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 493, 495-96 (2000). For current
example, see Eriq Gardner, Judge Won't Speed Up 'Ender's Game' Commission Dispute, THE
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Oct. 11, 2013, available at http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thresq/judge-wont-speed-up-enders-647777.
8. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 171, 185 (McKinney 2004); see also N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 37
(McKinney 2004).
9. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171(8) ("'Theatrical employment agency' means any person ...
who procures or attempts to procure employment . . . , but such term does not include the
business of managing such entertainments, exhibitions or performances, or the artists or
attractions constituting the same where such business only incidentally involves the seeking of
employment therefor.").
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for the artist.1o As a result, the talent manager would be entitled to a
commission under the artist-manager contract even if the manager is not a
licensed talent agent.
The difference between the two statutes has created different
environments for talent managers in California and New York. Despite the
manager's (or artist's) inability to dictate the geographic location of certain
types of employment in the entertainment industry, New York agency law
inherently appears on its face to be more favorable to talent managers than
the TAA." This note will, however, argue that the TAA is a preferable
arrangement as it provides better protection of the artist, allows little room
for abuse by the manager and agent as fiduciaries of the artist, provides a
clear legal structure and predictable outcomes, and upholds the public
policy underlying talent agent regulation.
This note primarily compares two key statutory provisions that
supervise the relationship between talent manager and artist, and advocates
for California's scheme over New York's. Further, while commentators,
justices, and personal manager collectives have advocated for the addition
of an incidental booking exception to the TAA, or for the creation of a
personal talent manager's statute, this note will argue why neither
remedy is necessary today. 12 Part II covers the general roles and duties
of talent managers and agents, the legislative history of the TAA
and California's case law, and New York's Employment Agency Law
history and subsequent case law.
Part III analyzes the main
distinctions between California and New York, specifically, the incidental
booking exception and the TAA's agent-manager collaboration safe harbor.
Part IV discusses how the TAA's structure is preferable over New York's
scheme while considering the underlying duties of the manager and agent,
past proposals to alter the TAA and California's entertainment industry, the
TAA's safe harbor for manager and agent collaboration, and the public
policy each statute seeks to support. Part V concludes by suggesting that
the TAA's current iteration is effective in protecting artists from
unscrupulous third parties.

10. Id.; see also Pawlowski v. Woodruff, 203 N.Y.S 819, 820 (App. Term. 1924) (holding
that the manager-artist contract was indeed a contract for management, and that the employment
procured was only incidental to the duties of the plaintiff-manager).
11. See infra Part II.C.
12. See generally Heath B. Zarin, Note, The California Controversy over Procuring
Employment: A Casefor the PersonalManagers Act, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 927 (1997); Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prod., Inc., 41 Cal. App. 4th 246, 253-54 (1995); see,
e.g., Stop the California Talent Agencies Act, STOPTAA.ORG, http://websd-stoptaaorg.webs.com/
(last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
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II. Background
To understand a scenario in which disputes arise under the TAA
and the New York Employment Agency Law, and to effectively
compare the statutes, consider a basic hypothetical: while working on a
movie set for a fledgling actor, who is not currently represented by an
agent, the actor's manager begins a conversation with the film's producerdirector. Although the actor has a minimal role in the current production,
the manager and producer-director begin discussing other projects during
down time on the set. The conversation ends with the producer-director
giving the actor an audition for a substantial role in the next film. When
the actor is contracted for the substantial role in the film, the manager
requests to be compensated for this particular engagement as he procured
it. The actor refuses, however, claiming that the manager is not entitled to
a commission payment pursuant to their contract because the manager
acted as an unlicensed talent agent, and files a complaint against the
manager to invalidate the contract. This scenario is generally litigated
between managers and artists, and this note will demonstrate that different
results can be effectuated in California and New York.
A.

Talent Managers and Agents

Theatrical employment agency law was created to protect artists from
unprofessional and devious talent agents seeking to take advantage of new
artists attempting to break into the entertainment industry. 13 As a threshold
matter, it is important to distinguish the different roles managers and agents
play in the career of an artist.
According to the TAA, talent agents and agencies are individuals or
institutions that engage in the occupation of "procuring, offering,
promising, or attempting to procure employment or engagements for an
artist . . .. "4

These responsibilities include the negotiation of employment

contracts and general career development advice.15 One commentator has
defined an agent as a commodity trader of talent, who mediates between
buyers and sellers of talent.' 6 Talent agents are generally compensated on a
percentage of the artist's earnings through the employment opportunities
they procure, and these fees are customarily ten percent.

13.
Walton,
14.
15.

See Marathon Entm't., Inc. v. Blasi, 42 Cal. 4th 974, 984 (2008); see also Meyers v.
76 Misc. 510, 511-12 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912).
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a).
FrequentlyAsked Questions, ASS'N OF TALENT AGENTS, http://www.agentassociation.com/

frontdoor/faq.cfm (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
16. Birdthistle, supra note 7, at 503.
17. Id.
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Talent managers tend to focus more on the personal lives of the artist,
advising on the aspects of daily life as an artist and developing the artist's
long-term career goals.' 9 Essentially, a manager advises the artist on which
20
employment opportunities to accept that are procured by an agent.
Frequently, managers are the first professional contact that a fledgling artist
has.2' Managers advertise their industry contacts and track record with
22
other successful artists to secure a manager-artist services contract.
Talent management fees tend to be higher than that of an agent,
customarily between ten percent to fifty percent of the artist's gross
earnings.23
The agent and manager make up the team which (theoretically)
works synergistically to further the artist's career on a system of
checks and balances. Operating within the law, the agent will procure
employment opportunities for the artist and the manager will counsel the
artist on employment opportunities.24 The structure of theatrical agency
law limits both the manager and agent from taking advantage of the artist,
and limits any fiduciary conflict of interest that the manager or agent may
have in evaluating a particular employment opportunity.25
Nonetheless, the lifecycle and practical reality of the entertainment
industry creates a conundrum for managers. Managers typically are the
first contact of a young artist, and successful agents will not likely
represent a new artist where there is no visible return on investment.26 As
such, the manager is put in a position where, to procure a successful career
for the artist, the manager must generate employment opportunities for the
artist to gain visibility until an agent will represent him or her.27 When

18. James M. O'Brien III, Comment, Regulation of Attorneys Under California's Talent
Agencies Act: A Tautological Approach to Protecting Artists, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 471, 478-81
(1992); see also Anna Vocino, Agent Commissions: Union & Non-Union, THE ACTOR'S
NETWORK (Nov. 16, 2011), available at http://actors-network.com/blog/agent-commissionsunion-non-union/.
19. Birdthistle, supra note 7, at 507; see, e.g., Park v. Deftones, 71 Cal. App. 4th 1465,
1469-70 (1999) ("Personal managers primarily advise, counsel, direct, and coordinate the
development of the artist's career. They advise in both business and personal matters, frequently
lend money to young artists, and serve as spokespersons for the artists."); see also Frequently
Asked Questions, TALENT MANAGERS ASS'N, http://talentmanagers.info/ (last visited Oct 20,2014).
20. David Zelenski, Talent Agents, Personal Managers, and Their Conflicts in the New
Hollywood, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 980 (2003).
21. O'Brien III, supra note 18, at 481.
22. Id. at 481-82.
23. Id. at 483.
24. Zelenski, supra note 20, at 980.
25. However, this structure does not include situations where an agent serves as a manager as well.
26. Zelenski, supra note 20, at 994.
27. Id.
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managers step into the ecosystem reserved for the agent, complications
ensue under both the TAA and New York Employment Agency Law.28
B. California's Talent Agencies Act
The TAA's history extends back to 1913 with the passing of the Private
Employment Agencies Law, which imposed licensing requirements for
employment agents. 29 The legislature was primarily concerned with agents
taking advantage of artists.3 0 Some of the concerns involved conflicts of
interest, including fee splitting between agents or sending artists to "houses
of ill fame." 3 ' The multiple iterations of the TAA, whose present form
came about in 1978,32 is the codification of the legislature's continual
concern of preventing exploitation of the artist.
The only relative
expansion of the TAA came about in 1982 when the legislature passed an
amendment that allowed unlicensed individuals to avoid a violation of the
TAA if they worked in concert with a licensed agent. 34
The California Legislature has made attempts to provide a regulatory
scheme to govern and regulate talent managers.
The most recent
attempt was the 1999 Kuehl Amendment, which sought to create
licensing and testing requirements for talent managers to ensure that
fledgling artists know they are being represented by a reputable statelicensed manager.35 The proposal paralleled the TAA in most structural
regards, but did not provide any real solution to the present concern as
agents remained the only party allowed the procure employment.
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court held that the TAA does "apply
to [talent] managers as well as agents." 3 7

28. Id. at 995; see, e.g., Richard Busch, Walking on the California's Talent Agencies Act
Thin Ice: Personal Managers Beware!, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
richardbusch/2013/03/25/walking-on-the-california-talent-agency-acts-thin-ice-personal-managersbeware/; see also Gary E. Devlin, Comment, The Talent Agencies Act: Reconciling the
Controversies Surrounding Lawyers, Managers, and Agents Participating in California's
EntertainmentIndustry, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 381, 385-86 (2001).
29. Marathon Entm't., Inc. v. Blasi, 42 Cal. 4th 974, 984 (2008).
30. Id.
31. Id. (citation omitted).
32. The TAA was codified to its present scheme at CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700; see also
Birdthistle, supra note 7, at 512.
33. Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prod., Inc., 41 Cal. App. 4th 246, 254 (1995).
34. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44 (see discussion infra Part II.B.2); see Birdthistle, supra
note 7, at 511-12; see also Devlin, supra note 28, at 389.
35. S. Comm. § 884, 1999 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999); see also Donald E. Biederman,
Film/TV Agents v. Managers Revisited, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 5, 15 (1999).
36. S. Comm. § 884, 1999 Assemb., Reg. Sess.
37. Marathon Entm't., Inc. v. Blasi, 42 Cal. 4th 974, 980 (2008).
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The TAA essentially prohibits unlicensed individuals from acting as a
Licensed talent agencies must comply with the procedural
talent agent.
requirements of the TAA, which include submitting form contracts and
fees to the state, posting bond, and prohibitions against discrimination
and certain types of conflicts of interest. 39 For controversies arising under
the TAA, the parties in dispute must first petition the California Labor
Commissioner with an appeal reviewable de novo in the California superior
court.4 0 In the aim of protecting the artist and the general policy of the
TAA, California case law provides a remedy where any "unlicensed
person's contract with an artist to provide the services of a talent agent is
illegal and void." 4 1
C.

The Traditional TAA Application, Preston, and Marathon.

Two major decisions in recent years have affected how the TAA
operates procedurally and the outcomes in artist-manager disputes. The
first wrinkle in the procedure of these disputes was developed in the 2008
42
The Court
United States Supreme Court decision of Preston v. Ferrer.
held that where the parties agree to arbitrate disputes pursuant to a
provision in their contract, the Federal Arbitration Act supersedes the
TAA. 4 3 This principle enables arbitration clauses to be valid in artistmanager and artist-agent relationships, as opposed to only allowing
adjudication before the California Labor Commissioner as the TAA
permits. The second significant case, Marathon Entertainment, Inc. v.
Blasi (also decided in 2008), was a landmark decision for the case law
dynamic of the TAA. Marathon formally introduced severability into the
44
TAA ecosystem, which provided some recourse for managers.
Nevertheless, before this decision, there were numerous examples of the
traditional TAA application where a manager was unable to recover for lost
commissions while acting as an unlicensed talent agent.
Traditionally, courts and the California Labor Commissioner have
applied a strict interpretation of the TAA, which provides no relief for

38.
39.
40.

CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.5.
See id. at §§ 1700.23-1700.47.
Id. at § 1700.44; see also Buchwald v. Katz, 8 Cal. 3d 493, 498 (1972) (holding that the

standard review for appeals should be de novo rather than review of the prior proceeding).
41. Styne v. Stevens, 26 Cal. 4th 42, 51 (2001); see also Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prod., Inc.,
41 Cal. App. 4th 246 (1995); see also Buchwald v. Super. Ct., 254 Cal. App. 2d 347, 351 (1967)
("[S]ince the clear object of the Act is to prevent improper persons from becoming artists'
managers and to regulate such activity for the protection of the public, a contract between an
unlicensed artist's manager and an artist is void.").
42. Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S 346 (2008).
43. Id. at 359; see also 9 U.S.C. § 1.
44. Marathon Entm't., Inc. v. Blasi, 42 Cal. 4th 974, 997 (2008).
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managers who procure employment for their client. 4 5 The Waisbren v.
Peppercorn Productions decision embodies the bright-line judicial
approach that any unlicensed activity is covered by the TAA. 46 In
Waisbren, the manager's occasional procurement of employment was
incidental to his other responsibilities.47 The court recognized that the
remedial purpose of the TAA, and that its "licensing scheme contemplates
that the 'occasional talent agent,' like the full-time agent, is subject to
regulatory control.'
Citing the California Entertainment Commission,49
the court highlighted the black and white approach to the regulation of
agents and managers: "one either is, or is not, licensed as a talent agent,
and, if not so licensed, one cannot expect to engage, with impunity, in any
activity relating to the services which a talent agent is licensed to render." 50
In a more notorious example,5 ' the former manager for the Deftones,
Dave Park, sued for breach of contract against the band for unpaid
commissions. 52 The California Labor Commissioner found that Park had
obtained eighty-four engagements for the Deftones without a license.5 3
The court followed the reasoning of Waisbren54 and stressed the report
filed by the California Entertainment Commission and its conclusion that
''personal managers or anyone not licensed as a talent agent should not,
under any condition or circumstances, be allowed to procure
employment . . without being licensed as a talent agent." 55
45. Zarin, supra note 12, at 962.
46. Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th 246; see also DONALD E. BIEDERMAN ET AL., LAW AND
BUSINESS OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 56-60 (Greenwood Publ'g Grp., 5th ed. 2007).
47. Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 250.
48. Id. at 255. The court did not believe that incidental procurement was valid ... .] unless
his procurement efforts cross some nebulous threshold from 'incidental' to 'principal.' Such a
standard is so vague as to be unworkable and would undermine the purpose of the Act." Id.
49. Id. at 256. The California Entertainment Commission was created by the California
Legislature to "study the laws and practices of this state, the State of New York, and other
entertainment capitals of the United States relating to the licensing of agents and representatives
of artists ... to enable the commission to recommend to the Legislature a model bill regarding
this licensing." Id. Personal managers and the procurement of employment for artists was their
main focus. The Commission held that the TAA should remain intact, but recommended small
alterations. See id. (citing former LAB. CODE § 1701, added by Stats.1982, ch. 682, § 6, p. 2816
and repealed by Stats. 1984, ch. 553, § 6, p. 2187).
50. Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 258.
5 1. See Jonathan E. Stern, Talent Agency Act - Don't Procure Employment Without a
License, ASS'N OF TALENT AGENCIES (Jan. 1, 2008), http://www.agentassociation.com/frontdoor/
newsdetail.cfn?id=306; see also Busch, supra note 28.
52. Park v. Deftones, 71 Cal. App. 4th 1465, 1466-68 (1999).
53. Id. at 1468.
54. See BIEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 46, at 58-60 (explaining that the bright line rule in
Waisbren was underscored in Park).
55. Park, 71 Cal. App. 4th at 1472 (stressing the California Labor Commissioner's
reluctance to endorse incidental procurement).
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In 2008, the California Supreme Court decided Marathon, which
altered the legal environment for managers.56 Marathon Entertainment
sued Rosa Blasi for breach of contract and sought recovery of unpaid
commissions." In 1998, Blasi hired Marathon to be her personal manager
in exchange for fifteen percent of her earnings "from entertainment
employment obtained during the course of the contract."58 Marathon
claimed that Blasi failed to pay commission due from her Strong Medicine
employment contract after she began to reduce her commission payments
to ten percent in 2001, and eventually ceased payments altogether. 59 Blasi
argued that Marathon procured employment as an unregistered talent agent,
thus violating the TAA.60 The Labor Commissioner concluded that
Marathon in fact violated the TAA by soliciting and procuring
engagements for Blasi, and thus voided the contract ab initio which barred
Marathon from recovery pursuant to the TAA. 6 1
In an opinion from Justice Werdegar, the court agreed with the Labor
Commissioner that Marathon had procured engagements for Blasi without
a license, and thus violated the TAA.62 Justice Werdegar then
addressed whether or not Marathon could obtain partial recovery of
fees and commissions duly owed under the contract by using severability
under section 1599 of the California Civil Code.63 Justice Werdegar
concluded that the TAA and severability were not in conflict and that the
Labor Commissioner had severed contracts unilaterally without citing
section 1599.64 Moreover, since the legislature had not "seen fit to specify
the remedy for violations" of the TAA, the rules of interpretation suggested
that section 1599 applies to TAA disputes.6 5

56. See generally Edwin F. McPherson, Did Marathon and Preston Kill the Talent Agencies Act?,
38 SW. L. REv. 443 (2009); see also Marathon Entm't., Inc. v. Blasi, 42 Cal. 4th 974 (2008).
57. Marathon, 42 Cal. 4th at 981.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 981-82.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 990 (explaining that the parties stipulated that Marathon did not hold a license,
and that there was no dispute over whether Marathon had procured engagements for Blasi).
63. Marathon, 42 Cal. 4th at 990-98; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1599 (West 1872)
("Where a contract has several distinct objects, of which one at least is lawful, and one at least is
unlawful, in whole or in part, the contract is void as to the latter and valid as to the rest.").
64. Marathon, 42 Cal. 4th at 991-92; see Danielewski v. Agon Inv. Co., No. TAC 41-03, at 9
(Cal. Lab. Comm'r Oct. 28, 2005) (invalidating the agreement but partially enforced payment of
commission for lawful services); see also Gittelman v. Karolat, No. TAC 24-02, at 14-16
(Cal. Lab. Comm'r July 19, 2004) (finding the pre-1997 commissions enforceable while
invalidating the post-1997 commissions that were unlawfully procured).
65. Marathon,42 Cal. 4th at 996.
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Two previous California cases had reflected on the idea of severability
in TAA artist-manager disputes. The appellate court in Yoo v. Robi found
that the plaintiff-manager procured employment in violation the TAA,
and the contract was thus voided under the traditional approach.
The
court reasoned that the decision of severability is weighed by "equitable
considerations. 6 7 First, the trade-off here was the "unbargained" benefit to
the artist in not having to pay for management services against "a dilution
of the deterrent effect of invalidating the entire contract" if severability was
to be applied.68 Second, decided with the Marathon court nearing a
decision, the court in Chiba v. Greenwald did not permit severability
because the trial court determined that the legal and illegal terms of the
contract were inextricably intertwined, thereby making the contract invalid
as a whole. 69

In Marathon, Justice Werdegar continued his severability analysis
expounding that:
If the central purpose of the contract is tainted with illegality, then
the contract as a whole cannot be enforced. If the illegality is
collateral to the main purpose of the contract, and the illegal
provision can be extirpated . .. by means of severance or
restriction, then such severance and restriction are appropriate.7 0
In a fashion not necessarily in accord with the TAA, Justice Werdegar
specified that managers who truly act as managers and procure
employment in an isolated incident should be allowed to recover for
services rendered that do not require a license.7 1 The court held that
severability could be applied in the present case, but since it is an equitable
doctrine and a fact specific analysis, it is more appropriate for the Labor
Commissioner and trial courts to decide, and the case was remanded for
further proceedings.72

66. Yoo v. Robi, 126 Cal. App. 4th 1089, 1105 (2005).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Chiba v. Greenwald, 156 Cal. App. 4th 71, 81-82 (2007). The dissent by Justice
Johnson, who penned the decision in Yoo v. Robi, expressed at great length the considerations for
allowing severability in this case. Id. at 82. He noted that no matter what the Marathon court
would eventually decide, the parties here should be allowed severability. Id. at 86-90.
70. Id. at 97-98 (citing Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. 29 Cal. 4th 1064, 1074 (2003)).
71. Marathon Entm't., Inc. v. Blasi, 42 Cal. 4th 974, 998 (2008) (citing Lindenstadt v. Staff

Builders, 55 Cal. App. 4th 883, 894 (1997) (where a real estate broker acted in some instances as a
broker without a license, and the finder could recover for services that did not require a license)).
72. Marathon, 42 Cal. 4th at 998-99 (discussing the letters and briefs submitted by
managers showing their "uniform dissatisfaction with the Act's application"). Justice Werdegar
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The court in Marathon solidified the fact that managers that act as
talent agents without a license can still recover the commissions owed via
severability principles on non-agent services performed under the artistmanager contract.73 In Dwight Yoakam v. The Fitzgerald Hartley Co., the
California Labor Commissioner decided that the management contract
where the manager procured engagements for the recording artist was not
void ab initio.
The Labor Commissioner held that the procured
engagements were "collateral to the main objective of the [management]
contract," and the manager's violations of the TAA were severed from the
contract." Conversely, the Labor Commissioner in Kyle Bluff v. Paris Djon
found the artist-manager agreement void ab initio on the grounds that the
manager provided very little management services and spent most of his
time procuring employment for the band.76 The Labor Commissioner
balked at an application of severance under Marathon because "the central
purpose of the contract between the parties was to unlawfully procure
musical engagements.
After Preston and Marathon, some commentators discussed the
viability of the TAA and whether these decisions materially altered the
legal landscape for managers and artists under the TAA.
In the years
following these decisions, however, the Labor Commissioner still
adjudicates a healthy amount of TAA disputes. Since 2008, the Labor
Commissioner has heard 50 different disputes, while it rendered 204
published decisions between 1971 and 2007.79 Comparatively, between
2008 and 2013, the Labor Commissioner adjudicated an average of ten
disputes per year, whereas between 1971 and 2007, an average of just
nearly six disputes per year.80 This comparison encapsulates that the Labor

believed that the legislative result of the TAA created a black market for agent services:
"Adopted with the best of intentions, the Act and guild regulations aimed at protecting artists
evidently have resulted in a limited pool of licensed talent agencies and, in combination with high
demand for talent agency services, created the right conditions for a black market for unlicensed
talent agency services." Id.
73. See generally id. at 996-99; see also McPherson, supra note 56, at 462 ("Under
Marathon, unless the violations by the manager so permeate the entire relationship between that
manager and the artist that the unlawful acts cannot be severed from the lawful acts, the
agreement will not be voided.. . ").
74. Yoakam v. The Fitzgerald Hartley Co., No. TAC-8774, at 19-20 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r.

Jan. 9, 2009).
75.

Id. at 21.

76.

Bluff v. Djon, No. TAC-17277, at 4-5 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r Jan. 17, 2011).

77.

Id. at 4.

78.

McPherson, supra note 56.

79.

Division of Labor StandardsEnforcement-TalentAgency Cases, CAL. DEP'T OF INDUS.

RELATIONS, http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/dlse-tacs.htm (last revised May 8, 2013).
80. Id.
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Commissioner still adjudicates a significant number of TAA disputes post
Preston and Marathon,8 1 unlike some commentators' predictions.
1.

The TAA Agent-ManagerCollaborationSafe Harbor

Uniquely, the TAA provides a safe harbor for managers who act in
conjunction with a registered talent agent in the negotiation of an
employment contract. 82 The California Labor Commissioner breaks down
the provision into a two-part analysis: (1) whether the manager acted
in conjunction with, and at the request of, the registered talent agent,
and (2) whether the manager's activities are considered "the negotiation of
an employment contract."83 In Plana v. Quinn, the manager and agent
agreed that the manager would contact the casting manager for the
television program Ugly Betty.84 The Labor Commissioner held in favor of
the manager, stating that "the Labor Commissioner has historically
considered acts completed in furtherance of securing employment for
In
artist's aspects of the negotiation of an employment contract."8
Transeau v. 3 Artist Management, the Labor Commissioner held that the
safe harbor did not apply to the manager, as "'procurement' includes any
active participation in a communication with a potential purchaser of the
artist's services aimed at obtaining employment for the artist, regardless of
who initiated the communication or who finalized the deal."" The TAA's
safe harbor allows for collaboration between managers and agents to spread
the workload and risk of managing all portions of the artist's career. This
safe harbor is an underutilized, and underpublicized, provision of the TAA
that talent managers should employ more often.
D. New York's Employment Agency Law

New York's talent agency law is regulated in a single statute, which
additionally covers employment agencies for nurses, emigrant job seekers,
and general employment agencies that procure, or claim to procure,
81. This increased number may also indicate that more TAA disputes are being litigated as
well given the healthier environment for managers to seek recourse. It should be noted that this
comparison does not take into account any private arbitration disputes allowed under Preston.
82. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44 ("It is not unlawful for a person or corporation which is not
licensed pursuant to this chapter to act in conjunction with, and at the request of, a licensed talent
agency in the negotiation of an employment contract.").
83. Plana v. Quinn, No. TAC-15652, at 6 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r Feb. 24, 2012) (finding that
the manager was acting in conjunction with the agent pursuant to the statute, and applying the
severability doctrine under Marathon).
84. Id.
85. Id.

86. Transeau v. 3 Artist Mgmt., No. TAC-7306, at 14 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r Jun. 16, 2009)
(denying the safe harbor to the manager where the talent agent finalized the deal); see also
Arsenio Hall v. X Mgmt., Inc., No. TAC 19-09 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r Apr. 24, 1992).

2015]

TALENT MANAGERS ACTING As AGENTS REVISITED

125

The statute requires
employment engagements for job seekers. 87
employment agents to obtain a license88 from the state and post a bond in
case conflicts arise. 89 Section 171(8) of the New York General Business
Law defines a "[t]heatrical employment agency" as "any person . .. who
procures or attempts to procure employment or engagements for circus,
vaudeville, the variety field, the legitimate theater, motion pictures, radio,
television, phonograph recordings, transcriptions, opera, concert, ballet,
modeling or other entertainments or exhibitions or performances . . ."9o
The statute provides an exception for nonlicensed managers who procure
employment engagements where the procurement was incidental to their
management duties. 91 Much like the TAA, any individual who operates an
employment agency or acts as an employment agent without a license,
violates the statute and cannot lawfully receive commissions. The statute
also contemplates a fee ceiling of ten percent per individual engagement.
With a similar public policy 94 underpinning the TAA, New York's
talent agency origins date back to 1910,9 prior to the TAA's ancestral
birth. To enforce this public policy, the New York law can (1) regulate the
conduct of the agency, for example by prohibiting an agent from sending
an artist to a place "maintained for immoral or illicit purposes,"96 and (2) allow
criminal proceedings for violations under the statute.
Traditional case law in which managers procure engagements parallels
that of California's TAA. In the 1912 case of Meyers v. Walton, the court
held that a contract that contemplated management duties to be rendered
between a manager and a vaudeville performer was unenforceable because
the manager acted solely as a booking agent and procured employment for
the artist.98 Citing precedent, the court noted that "[o]ne who is required by
87. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 171; see also N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 37 (contemplating the
same sections of the New York General Business Law, but providing restrictions for engagements
with employers who have a record of not paying salaries and such).
88. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 172-177.
89. Id. at H§ 177-178.
90. Id. at § 171(8).
91. Id. For coverage of the incidental booking exception, see discussion infra Part III.A.
92. Id. at § 172.
93. Id. at § 185(8). The fee ceiling applies to all types of theatrical employment except for
"engagements for orchestras and for employment or engagements in the opera and concert
fields," where the limit is twenty percent per engagement. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 185(8).
94. See discussionsupra Part II.B.1.
95, Koh Siok Tian Wilson, Talent Agents as Producers: A Historical Perspective of Screen
Actors Guild Regulation and the Rising Conflict with Managers, 21 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 401,
403-04 (2001).
96. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 187(6).
97, See id. at § 190.
98. Meyers v. Walton, 76 Misc. 510, 511 (N.Y. App. Term 1912).

126

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[37:1

law to procure a license to conduct any trade, calling, or profession may not
recover for services rendered . . ."99 In Pine v. Laine, the court found that
an unlicensed manager who sought music recording contracts for an artist
violated the statute. 00 Since the artist already had a manager, and the
defendant only pursued employment opportunities for the artist, the court
found that the defendant was clearly acting as an unlicensed agent and denied
recovery for services rendered.'o' Had the defendant already been the
artist's primary manager, however, there could have been a possibility for
utilizing section 171(8)'s incidental booking exemption.
IH. The Key California-New York Distinctions
This section addresses the two major distinctions between the TAA
and New York Employment Agency Law: (1) New York's incidental
booking exception, and (2) California's manager-agent collaboration safe harbor.
A. New York's Incidental Booking Exception

The TAA and New York Employment Agency Law read nearly the same,
aside from the incidental booking exception present in New York's statute.' 0 2
Section 171(8) of the New York General Business Law provides that:
Theatrical employment agency means any person ...
who
procures or attempts to procure employment ... but such term
does not include the business of managing such entertainments,
exhibitions or performances, or the artists or attractions
constituting the same where such business only incidentally
involves the seeking of employment therefor.'o3
This exemption allows a manager who is operating under a
management contract with an artist to procure employment if it is
incidental to the manager's regular duties under the contract. 104
New York case law gives insight into how the courts have viewed the
structure of this exception.
One of the earliest examples came in
Pawlowski v. Woodruff where a manager was able to recover commission
owed under the management agreement with the artist, even though the
manager was not a registered agent under the New York statute. 05 The
99. Id. (citing Sirkin v. Fourteenth Street Store, 124 A.D. 384, 388-89 (1908)).
100. Pine v. Laine, 36 A.D.2d 924, 924-25 (N.Y App. Div. 1971).
101. Id
102. Birdthistle, supra note 7, at 519.
103. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 171(8) (emphasis added).
104. Birdthistle, supra note 7, at 519-20.
105. Pawlowski v. Woodruff, 122 Misc. 695 (N.Y. App. Term 1924).
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court found that the manager was entitled to relief because the contract was
indeed a contract for artist management services, and the employment
procurement was only incidental to the services provided for under the
contract.' 06 The Pawlowski court concluded that an "employment agency
could not circumvent the statute by putting its contract to procure
employment for an artist in the form of an agreement for management."10 7
Following Pawlowski, courts have continued to recognize that when a
dispute arises and a valid artist-manager contract exists, the incidental
booking exception will be recognized, so long as the provisions are
management focused. 108
In Washington v. Escobar, a New York court affirmed the position in
Pawlowski, stating that the agreement between the manager and agent was
a contract for management services, not an agency contract. 09 The
contract contained clauses explicitly indicating that the manager was "not
an employment agency," and there was no promise to procure employment
under the contract." 10 Additionally, when New York courts have found that
the primary purpose of a manager-artist agreement did not pertain to
management duties, they have not enforced the exception."' In Friedkin v.
Harry Walker, the court held: "the instant contract cannot be characterized
as one of management . .. [Friedkin] is clearly an unlicensed employment
agency . . and the exclusionary provision of [section 171(8) of the New
York General Business Law] is clearly inapplicable.""1 2 These cases stand
for the idea that management centric contracts allow more breathing room
within the incidental booking exception than contracts that are not clearly
focused on management duties.
As previously noted, this exception is not currently present in the TAA,
but the California legislature has made multiple efforts to adopt a similar
incidental booking provision."1 3 In 1972, the Conference of Personal
Managers proposed an incidental booking exception as part of an
106.

Id. at 697.

107.

Id.

108. See, e.g., Russell-Stewart, Inc. v. Birkett, 24 Misc. 2d 528, 530 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960)
(holding that the language of the contract was that of an employment agency agreement, not a
management agreement, was contrary to public policy and was not enforceable); see also
Gervis v. Knapp, 182 Misc. 311, 313 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943) (citing Pawlowski, 122 Misc. at 695)
(finding no weight in the argument against enforcing the contract where a "contract establishes
that the plaintiff was primarily a manager").
109. Washington v. Escobar, No. 103027/09, 2009 WL 2912383, at *14-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Aug. 28, 2009).
110. Id. at *14.
111. E.g., Friedkin v. Harry Walker, 90 Misc. 2d 680 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1977).
112. Id. at 613-14.
113. Neville A. Johnson & Daniel Webb Lang, The Personal Manager in the California
EntertainmentIndustry, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 375, 404 n. 168 (1979).
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amendment to the Labor Code applicable to employment agents.' 14 This
organization sought to obtain consistent statutes between jurisdictions as
managers' activities are based primarily between California and New
York. 1 5 California talent agents who criticized the exception strongly
opposed the- amendment, arguing that allowing managers to incidentally
procure employment in California without a license would violate
collective bargaining agreements." 6 In particular, the provisions "affecting
duration of contracts with artists and fees chargeable under such contracts"
were of concern to the guilds and agents."'7 Individual members of the
California Labor Commissioner and representatives of the Screen Actors
Guild criticized the incidental booking exception on the basis that it would
be "unadministrable."" 8 During the hearings, the effectiveness of the New
York approach was analyzed and was determined to be difficult to
assess." 9
Jurisdiction was an additional concern raised during the
hearings.1 2 0 The determination of whether or not the procurement was
incidental is left to the courts in New York, whereas the California Labor
Commissioner has jurisdiction to hear the dispute before it reaches the
superior court.121
Nevertheless, commentators and judges alike have advocated that
California should adopt a similar provision.122 In Waisbren, Justice
Masterson recognized that allowing a manager to spend a majority of his
time to procure employment for the artist would violate the legislative
intent behind the TAA."' But the "fact that an unlicensed manager may
devote an 'incidental' portion of his time to procurement activities would
be of little consolation to the client who falls victim to a violation of the
Act." 24 Other commentators have argued for the various actors guilds who

114. Id.
115.

Id.

116. Id.
117. Id. (citing The Licensing and Regulation ofArtists, Managers, PersonalManagers, and
Musicians Booking Agencies Before the Cal. Senate Comm. on Industrial Relations 49-52, 216
(Nov. 20,1975)).
118. Johnson & Lang, supra note 113, at 404.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.; see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44. This amendment and subsequent debate
took place in 1982, twenty-six years before the decision of Preston v. Ferrer, see discussion
supra Part IB. 1.
122. See Zarin, supra note 12, at 932; see, e.g., Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prod., Inc., 41 Cal.
App. 4th 246, 255 (1995); see generallyBirdthistle, supra note 7.
123. Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 255 (holding that the TAA applies to part-time and fulltime talent agents, and if an individual acts as an agent without a license, then the representation

agreement is void); see also Wachs v. Curry, 13 Cal. App. 4th 616, 628 (1993).
124. Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 255.
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collectively bargain with entertainment agencies to oversee and regulate
personal managers.1 2 5
Nonetheless, Marathon upholds the principlel 26 in California that the
TAA does not recognize incidental procurement of employment to be an
exemption, and as such, incidental acts cannot be recovered for.1 27
B. The Agent-Manager Collaboration Safe Harbor Absence in New York Law

New York law does not contain a similar safe harbor 2 8 for managers
who procure employment in collaboration with a licensed agent. New
York law actually discourages managers and agents from working together,
as it rebuts the incidental booking exception. 129 By collaborating with an
agent in procuring employment for the artist, it is presumed that the
manager is engaged in too much of the employment procurement activity
and employment procurement is not incidental to the manager's regular
duties.1 30 This additional distinction creates a conflict of law between the
TAA's safe harbor and the incidental booking exception, which
commentators and justices have advocated to adopt. 13 1 In adding the
incidental booking exception to the TAA, the legislature would have to
remove the safe harbor provision. A manager procuring employment under
that provision would not be eligible to use the incidental booking exception
since the procurement is not incidental to their management duties and
would violate the TAA. Consequently, the incidental booking exception
and safe harbor provision cannot exist together.
IV. Outcomes and Acceptance of the Talent Agencies Act
As mentioned previously in Part II, common disputes between talent
managers and artists generate different results depending on the jurisdiction
in which the dispute is heard. Considering the discussion above, and the
hypothetical described in Part II, the differing jurisdictional results are
quite clear.

125. Birdthistle, supra note 7, at 499 ("[T]he most appropriate response to this situation is for
the entertainment guilds to use their strategic position in the industry to oversee personal
managers and to regulate the degree to which those managers can act as producers.").
126. Styne v. Stevens, 26 Cal. 4th 42, 51 (2001) ("The weight of authority is that even the

incidental or occasional provision of such services requires licensure.").
127. Marathon Entm't., Inc. v. Blasi, 42 Cal. 4th 974, 987-88 (2008).
128. See discussion supra part II.B.2.
129. Zarin, supra note 12, at 966 (citing Fred Jelin, The Personal Manager Controversy:
Carving the Turf in Counseling Clients in the Entertainment Industry 1993, at 471, 473 (PLI

Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 359, 1993)).
130. Id.
131. See discussion, supra part III.A.

HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J.

130

A.

[37:1

California's TAA Outcomes

Prior to the P*eston and Marathon decisions, a common dispute
between a manager and an artist would be resolved in the traditional
manner before the California Labor Commissioner. Thus, the actor in the
hypothetical posed in Part II of this note would prevail on his claim since
the manager acted as an unlicensed talent agent in violation of the TAA.
Accordingly, the Labor Commissioner would likely strike down the
agreement in its entirety due to the manager's TAA violation.13 2
After Preston and Marathon, however, the outcome would be less
damaging to a manager. Although the outcome on the merits would remain
the same, the Labor Commissioner would have the option133 to sever the
invalid portions of artist-manager contract, and the manager would be
allowed to recover the fees related to management activities. Thus, the
manager is made whole, but only as to the fees for management services
rendered. Under Preston, managers also have the option to resolve a claim
before a private arbitrator, thus reducing costs and increasing
convenience for managers. This change is a marked improvement for
managers who, prior to Marathon, had much more to lose if they
procured employment for an artist.
Additionally, the TAA's collaboration safe harbor flexibly allows for
another stream of work and fees for the manager. Applying the same facts
from the Part II hypothetical, assume the actor had an agent, and the
manager and agent agreed that the manager would contact the producerdirector on the set that day to negotiate upcoming opportunities for the
actor. The manager could be legally entitled to compensation for this
procurement under the TAA, if the manager helped conduct negotiations
over the contract. This safe harbor allows the manager and agent to
collaborate, and obtain more employment opportunities for their client in a
more efficient manner than a true separation of duties would allow.
B. New York's Employment Agency Law Outcomes
The Part II hypothetical generates a different result for the manager if
the scenario took place in New York. Claiming New York's incidental
booking exception, the manager could recover the fees for employment
procurement in accordance with the statute. Since the manager was present
on set while conducting management services for the artist, and subsequently
began discussing and procuring employment opportunities with the
producer-director incidentally, the manager would likely fall under the
exception. Nevertheless, to raise the incidental booking exception as a
132.
133.

See discussion, supra Part II.
See discussion, supra Part II.B.1.
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valid defense for the manager, the artist-manager contract must be clearly
structured as a contract for managerial services.1 3 4 As opposed to the TAA,
managers will be able to receive commissions for certain engagements
depending on (1) the manner in which the manager procured the
engagement, and (2) the structure of the artist-manager contract.
C. Keeping the TAA Intact

California's TAA in its present form is an imperfect regulatory
scheme. 135 The preceding hypotheticals illustrate that the statutes produce
different results in California and New York. However, if structured in the
proper way, employment procurement under the TAA creates more
equitable results for managers, while promoting the best treatment of the
artist in the process. Adding an incidental booking exception to the TAA
or a private manager statute could resolve issues managers face
currently, but the changes could put the underlying public policy of the
TAA in jeopardy.
Initially, the adoption of an incidental booking provision would cloud
the waters. As the New York courts have recognized, contracts between
artists and managers that mainly concern management duties are normally
valid if the manager procures employment incidentally to those duties.1 36
Managers in this type of arrangement still have the ability to take
advantage of artists and violate the policy underlying the TAA.'
Managers tend to charge more for services than agents do.1 3 8 An incidental
booking exception can create an environment where particularly devious
managers can charge high fees to fledgling artists, procure employment
incidentally, and thus reap the benefits of a higher commission rate than
agents are allowed to receive. Situations similar to Washington v. Escobarl39
can arise where an artist-manager contract is structured to effectuate the
allowance of the incidental booking exception, and in the case of a dispute,
the manager would be insulated from losing those high commissions.
Gamesmanship in contract-drafting would ensue to the detriment of artists
not well versed or experienced in hiring and contracting with personal
managers, which is exactly the type of abuse the TAA seeks to prevent.
Ultimately, these disputes would be resolved as a matter of contract
interpretation, as opposed to the fact that a manager violated the TAA. Adding

134.
135.

See supra Section II.A.
See generally supra Section II.

136. See supra Section III.
137. Marathon Entm't., Inc. v. Blasi, 42 Cal. 4th 974, 984 (2008).
138. O'Brien III, supra note 18, at 481-82; see also Zelenski, supra note 20, at 983.
139. See generally Washington v. Escobar, No. 103027/09, 2009 WL 2912383, at *14-15
(Sup. Ct. Aug. 28, 2009).
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the incidental booking exception can create room for abuse by managers,
and eliminate the predictable outcomes TAA disputes currently enjoy.
Adding an incidental booking exception to the TAA would also
conflict with its collaboration safe harbor for managers. The presumption
that negotiations of an engagement is not incidental to the manager's
regular duties, would not allow for the triggering of the incidental booking
exception, but it would be a valid exercise under the TAA's safe harbor.
By adding the incidental booking provision, the statute would generate
opposite results, and as such, they cannot coexist. By keeping the TAA
intact, the agent-manager collaboration safe harbor remains complete
and effectuates better results for the artist.
The TAA's current structure without an incidental booking exception
effectuates more desirable relationships between the artist, manager, and agent.
The strict disallowance under the TAA of managers procuring employment
keeps the roles and duties clear for each party involved with the artist. As
such, the TAA encourages a checks-and-balances system between the
artist, manager, and agent. Justice Werdegar in Marathon recognized,
however, that the division of duties between the manager and agent
"largely exists in theory," but the TAA encourages this type of divided
relationship more than New York's statute.140
Nonetheless, the California legislature recognized that the difference in
duties is not always followed, so the safe harbor for managers to procure
employment collaboratively with the agent purports to provide some
relief.14 1 The safe harbor allows for the manager and agent to work
together and spread some of the responsibilities while keeping the best
interest of the artist in mind. Additionally, the safe harbor can help reduce
conflicts of interest that may arise. Agents, the only individuals that can
procure employment, may only show an artist particular engagements to
pursue or engagements that they are personally involved in. 4 2 The safe
harbor does not eliminate this problem, but it diversifies engagement
procurement sources to a certain degree.1 4 3 The safe harbor enables the
checks and balances and imposes fiduciary duties upon the agent. A
manager, acting legally under the safe harbor, can generate a new stream of
engagements for the artist away from the agent, which perhaps the agent
could not, or would not, due to conflicts of interest. This safe harbor is a

140. Marathon, 42 Cal. 4th at 980.
141. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44.
142. Admittedly, this issue cannot be mitigated where an agent also acts as an artist's
personal manager.
143. See discussion, supra Part II.B.2; see, e.g., Plana v. Quinn, No. TAC-15652, at 5-6
(Cal. Lab. Comm'r Feb. 24, 2012); see also Transeau v. 3 Artist Mgmt., No. TAC-7306, at 14
(Cal. Lab. Comm'r June 16, 2009).
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deviation in the statute that New York does not have, which gives clarity to
the scope in which the manager can act.
Additionally, an act solely regulating personal managers may not be
necessary in the wake of recent California case law to provide managers
with protection. The combination of the decisions in Marathon and
Preston, and the TAA's safe harbor, create an environment for talent
managers has been altered dramatically. Managers are no longer at risk for
losing management fees over their entire contract, but only the fees
generated from violating the TAA.144 Disputes heard before the California
Labor Commissioner and private arbitrators now apply the Marathon
severability principle to achieve such a result. 14 5 Under the TAA's safe
harbor provision, managers are able to practice some level of valid
engagement negotiations that can provide another stream of legitimate fees
for them. Thus, managers today have more protection and scope of
activities than ever before. Nevertheless, a personal manager statute may
be necessary to protect the artist under the same public policy principles
that led to the enactment of the TAA; in fact, development of this type of
artist protection has begun to percolate outside the California legislature.
On March 4, 2014, Screen Actors Guild-American Federation of Television
and Radio Artists (SAG-AFTRA) released its first attempt to regulate the
conduct of talent managers. 14 6 In its voluntary ethics code, SAG-AFTRA
seeks to regulate talent manager contracts and fee structures, while
recognizing the exceptions under the TAA and New York law. 147 While
the code of conduct is still in its infancy, it represents a step toward
regulation of a personal manager's conduct, and the TAA and Marathon
provide commercial protection for managers.
Finally, the TAA's transparent statutory language and straightforward
enforcement by the California Labor Commissioner and appellate courts
provide clear and predictable outcomes. Agents and managers, who
choose to procure employment, understand that acting in accordance with
the statute will decrease the likelihood of conflicts. Despite the strictness

144. See generally McPherson, supranote 56, at 444.
145. See Todd v. Meagher, No. TAC-13418 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r Mar. 29, 2012) (invalidating
an entire agreement as illegal, and refusing to apply the severance doctrine); see Sebert v. DAS
Commc'n Ltd, No. TAC-19800 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r Mar. 29, 2012) (finding that severance of
illegal portions allowed for a 45% reduction in fees payable to DAS).
146. Jonathan Handel, Actors Union Introduces Voluntary Regulation of Talent Managers,
THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/sagaftra-introduces-voluntary-regulation-685773; see Personal Manager Code of Ethics and
Conduct, SAG-AFTRA (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.sagaftra.org/files/sag/documents/sag-aftra
personahnanagercodeethicsconduct.pdf; see also Birdthistle, supra note 7, at 522 and
accompanying text.
147. See generally SAG-AFTRA, supra note 146.
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of the TAA and its enforcement, the Marathon decision has given
managers more equity in these disputes by allowing severability and
upholding valid contracts where commercial actions have been taken as
illustrated by the hypotheticals above. 14 8 Additionally, the option to
adjudicate TAA claims before the California Labor Commissioner and
private arbitrators under Preston now enables quick and cost efficient
adjudication of disputes when they arise.

V. Conclusion
California and New York are the undisputed kings of the
entertainment industry, leaving a sizeable impact on the United States
economy as a whole.1 4 9 However, it seems odd that the two leading
jurisdictions treat talent managers in materially different ways. Courts,
commentators, and managers have been criticizing and critiquing the TAA
on the basis that it provides no equitable relief for managers when they,
albeit unlawfully, procure employment for their artist-client. In the case of
an artist who is not represented by an agent, what is the manager to do?
How can the manager act in the best interest of the artist without violating
the statute?
Commentators and managers have lobbied for multiple ways to resolve
this issue: the drafting of a talent manager statute, or the addition of an
incidental booking exception to the TAA are the most common remedies to
the issue. But a question still remains as to whether a talent manager
statute or the incidental booking exception could possibly fit within the
strong framework that Hollywood, and the entertainment industry in
general, has become accustomed to. Adopting either option could alter the
well-accepted public policy underpinning the statute and also lead to
massive reshaping of the currently successful bargaining agreements in
place with SAG-AFTRA and other artist representative institutions.
Admittedly, the current ecosystem for a talent manager in the
entertainment industry is challenging, but Marathon and Preston have
The TAA's current
begun to provide more relief for managers.
iteration is effective in protecting the artist from unscrupulous third
parties and satisfies the public policy grounded in the statute. Managers
and agents alike should focus on utilizing the current statutory scheme to
work together by using the TAA's collaboration safe harbor provision as an
alternative for spreading risks across more parties. By utilizing the TAA as
a mechanism to protect the artist, the manager and agent can best promote
the artist's interests.

148.

See generally Marathon Entm't., Inc. v. Blasi, 42 Cal. 4th 974, 974 (2008).
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See INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE, supra note 1, at 1.

